Showing posts with label Melanesia expert Jenny Haward Jones. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Melanesia expert Jenny Haward Jones. Show all posts

Friday, January 11, 2013

You Can't Please Everyone- Fiji's Draft Constitution

Jenny Hayward Jones latest post on The Interpreter on Fiji's draft constitution has some valid points, buttressed by conjecture:
This announcement was the culmination of a campaign from the Fiji regime to distance itself from the Commission it had itself established, which begs the question of why the regime bothered with the expense and effort of engaging international expertise, attracting support from donors and seeking the views of the people[...] It is difficult now to see how the Constituent Assembly, even if it has a fair representation, will have a reasonable opportunity to provide independent advice on the new constitution. It seems likely it will be hounded into rubber stamping the regime's new draft, with only a month promised for consideration.
Grubsheet post addressed some of the reservations Jones had penned:
Some, of course, will accuse the Government of disregarding the advice of the constitutional referee it appointed because what he came up with didn’t suit its purposes. Others who appeared before the Commission or lodged submissions will be aggrieved that the views they expressed are being ignored. Yet as the Bainimarama Government sees it, there are sound reasons for it to take the course it has and also to be aggrieved about many of the provisions of the document bequeathed to the nation by Professor Ghai and his fellow Commissioners.

Croz Walsh latest post, further provides salient points and reminds the astute political observer of the ineffable setbacks on Fiji's path:
The road from December 2006 to the promised elections in 2014 was never going to be an easy one. The potholes and patch-overs have proved to be far worse than those on Fiji roads.  And, as with the roads where cyclones, floods and poor workmanship, have often undone the good work, so also in the political scene.  Promising steps forward have too often been followed by too many steps back.
Jones while seemingly concerned about the democracy in Fiji, however- Jones' florid sentiments on Fiji's future democracy are incredibly disingenuous and misleading:
Fiji may end up with a flawed democracy but it wouldn't be the first flawed democracy to participate in international forums and enjoy stable diplomatic relations with the world's powers. Many flawed democracies have improved over time and even though Fiji has a way to go, there has at least been a public discussion about the future, which cannot be undone.
Croz outlined the benevolent policies :
There is far more to the credit of a government that launched the People's Charter that won the support of two-thirds of the adult population, despite opposition from these self-same critics and others in the old political establishment.  I cannot believe that a government that has placed so much emphasis on racial equality, a shared Fijian identity, national unity, and has done so much towards improving the country's physical and institutional infrastructure, not to mention its efforts to assist rural communities and the poor, is merely in power for self-serving purposes.
It is rather reprehensible of Jones, to gloss over the exceedingly greater flaws of preceding democracies in Fiji, in comparison to the existing path mapped out by the current Fiji Government.

Unfortunately, Jones has some disconcerting history of blatantly flippant analysis on Fiji's domestic politics, as highlighted by a 2009 SiFM post:
Interpreter's Melanesia specialist Jenny-Hayward Jones has got it wrong yet again, along with the biased media reports from ABC. Jones' latest posting, unashamedly uses the talking points of the SDL segment, highlighting the 2 pillars of society, warning of imminent danger to the general public if their dual-pronged influence is permanently removed from the landscape of Fiji politics.
Ironically both pillars were also intimately involved with Fiji's 1987 and 2000 coups and it is rather myopic and repulsively selective for Jones to obfuscate that well documented fact.
Radio Australia host Bruce Hill interviews Brij Lal, the academic from Australia National University on retainer, who cynically (as usual) opines on the draft constitution . Unsurprisingly, Bruce Hill's maker's mark of yellow journalism was underscored in the interview, by the routine absence of alternative perspectives in providing balance. Furthermore, Croz Walsh had highlighted in a blog post, the journalistic bias in Bruce Hill. Croz also posted the defense by Radio Australia of Bruce Hill.

 (Interview of Brij Lal /Bruce Hill posted below)


Brij Lal appears to echo his default reaction to any changes to the 1997 constitution, as addressed in a 2009 SiFM post:
Dr. Lal, later questioned the issue about the consultation phase, regarding this new Fiji Constitution. However the ABC host did not bother to challenge Lal's remarks or even bother to compare the present and continuing consultations, to the diluted 1997 version. Neither did ABC offer any other opposing views, apart from their favorite talking heads, in their so called forum.

A surreptitious version of due diligence; that was formed during Lal's celebrated and at times, over-glorified tenure as 'architect' of the 1997 Fiji Constitution. Irregardless of the glaring failures of the 1997 legal document; in the context of racial equality- a crucial issue which Brij Lal has vacillated on repeated occasions.

Video of Fiji President and Prime Minister's joint address on the draft constitution (posted below).


Club Em Designs

Thursday, November 29, 2012

Papua New Guinea in the Asian Century - Peter O'Neill, PNG Prime Minister

PNG Attitude covers Papua New Guinea's Prime Minister, Peter O'Neill's speech at the Distinguished Speaker Lecture aptly titled "Papua New Guinea in the Asian Century" hosted by the Lowy Institute.

Full audio of speech (Click here)

PNG Attitude describes O'Neil's speech:
In his quiet, understated way he showed not only a firm grasp of the demands of political leadership and how they must be met, but also a sophisticated understanding of the geo-strategic position of Papua New Guinea and what it will take to steer a steady course towards the nation’s goals.
Jenny Hayward Jones also briefly covers the contours of the speech, in a recent post in The Interpreter.


Thursday, January 13, 2011

The Embedded Point Of View- Fiji Friends & Neighbors



East Asia Forum website published an opinion article from Sandra Tarte of University of South Pacific, regarding Fiji's growing circle of Friends and the circumstances surrounding the geo-political axial shift.



The excerpt:

Fiji’s search for new friends

January 13th, 2011

Author: Sandra Tarte, USP, Suva

In 2010, Fiji marked 40 years of independence. Significantly, the Prime Minister, Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama, chose to celebrate the anniversary at the World Expo in Shanghai, rather than at home.

In many ways, this choice underscored the focus of Fiji’s leadership in 2010, which was to diversify and broaden international partnerships. Motivated by the need to deal with pressing economic problems at home and counter diplomatic sanctions that have isolated it from close neighbours Australia and New Zealand, and from the Pacific Islands Forum, Fiji adopted an increasingly proactive foreign policy in the past year.

This approach was matched by an evident willingness on the part of new and old friends to engage with Fiji and its government, notwithstanding the lack of progress towards democratic elections. This shift reflected a mix of opportunism, pragmatism and geo-political design (if not disquiet on the part of some at the shifting patterns of influence in the region).

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September, Prime Minister Bainimarama described Fiji’s new foreign policy orientation as an integral part of his Government’s Strategic Framework for Change – the set of reforms that he was committed to implementing before Fiji would return to elected government in 2014. But the search for alternative foreign partners has also been borne out of necessity, as a way to counter the effects of Fiji’s suspension in 2009 from key regional and international groupings (the Pacific islands Forum and Commonwealth).

Although often dubbed Fiji’s ‘Look North Policy’, the foreign policy trend in 2010 was to collaborate with everyone and anyone. Fiji sought membership of the Non Aligned Movement and announced the setting up of three new embassies in 2011 – in Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa. It hosted a visit from a Russian delegation, led by the resident Ambassador in Canberra, which aimed ‘to find concrete areas of cooperation’. Fiji’s Prime Minister and Attorney General also took part in a first-ever Pacific SIDS (Small Island Developing States)-Arab League Summit, which was hosted by Abu Dhabi in June. This initiative appeared to be in appreciation of the support of Pacific island members of the United Nations for the United Arab Emirates’ bid to host the International Renewable Energy Agency. One outcome of this summit was a proposal to open an Arab League office in the Pacific (possibly in Fiji – which was recognised by the Abu Dhabi host as ‘an administrative, economic and geographical hub’ of the region.)

The Pacific-Arab League summit underscored the growing role in the United Nations of the Pacific-SIDS group, and the diminishing significance of the Pacific Islands Forum bloc (of which Australia and New Zealand are members). This appeared to be the direct, though probably inadvertent, consequence of Fiji’s suspension from the Forum. The impact of this shift for Australia was remarked upon when Canada lost a crucial vote for United Nations Security Council rotating membership.

By far the most frequent high-level traffic in 2010 was to China. In part this was due to the World Expo in Shanghai, as mentioned earlier, which was seen as a golden opportunity to promote Fiji’s products and raise its profile (mainly, but not only, to China). There were several so-called trade missions to China led by the Prime Minister, a visit by the Foreign Minister and a visit by the country’s President, at the invitation of the Governor of Ningxia Province. Although the visits appeared mainly exploratory and few concrete outcomes were announced, a number of future deals were mooted, including new arms procurement (to support Fiji’s peacekeeping operations) and Chinese investment in the expansion of the Government shipyard and slipway in Suva.

Not to be outdone, Japan included Fiji’s Foreign Minister in its first ever PALM Ministerial Interim meeting, held in October in Tokyo. (This meeting aimed to follow-up and review the outcomes of the Fifth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting – PALM 5). The meeting also provided an opportunity for bilateral talks between the Fiji Foreign Minister and his Japanese counterpart, signaling a shift in policy by Japan towards closer engagement with Fiji.

The United States also announced a policy of more direct engagement with the Bainimarama Government in 2010, in line with its broader policy of ‘re-engagement’ with the Pacific islands. But there was little to show for this by the year’s end. Relations soured in the wake of the non-issuing of visas to senior Fiji government officials to attend international meetings, including at the United Nations. This reportedly prompted Prime Minister Bainimarama to suggest the relocation of the UN to China.

These diplomatic disputes with the US echoed tensions that continue to mar Fiji’s relations with its closest developed neighbors and trading partners – Australia and New Zealand. Despite some promising signs at the beginning of the year of a warming of ties, this failed to eventuate. The expulsion of Australia’s acting High Commissioner in July signaled a low-point in bilateral relations, with implications for regional politics.

The context of the diplomatic expulsion was reportedly Australia’s efforts to derail a meeting of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) in Fiji – and deny the Fijian Prime Minister the opportunity to assume chairmanship of the sub-regional group. Fiji had planned to turn the meeting into a broader MSG-Plus (including other Pacific island countries) and build the MSG into an alternative conduit for aid and diplomacy. The sudden cancellation of the meeting by MSG Chair (Vanuatu’s Prime Minister) was viewed by Fiji as a direct result of Australian and New Zealand pressure. But the situation was salvaged by turning the planned event into a politically successful ‘Engaging with the Pacific’ meeting at which Prime Minister Bainimarama played generous host and offered bilateral and regional assistance to his Pacific SIDS neighbors. A reconciliation ceremony in December subsequently served to heal the rift within the MSG between Fiji and Vanuatu.

While there remains support within the Fiji foreign affairs establishment for dialogue and engagement with Australia, New Zealand and the Forum, there is also a sense that time is running out. If Australia and New Zealand do not ‘restore ties’, so the argument goes, a generation of foreign affairs officers will emerge who, along with their counterparts in the Fiji Military Forces , will only know and want to ‘Look North’. Judging by events of the past year, Fiji’s realignment of its international relationships seems set to continue.

Dr Sandra Tarte is Director, Politics and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji.

This is part of a special feature: 2010 in review and the year ahead.

Print this post Print this post
Share:
View more posts by Sandra Tarte

Related Articles:

  1. Preventing Fiji from becoming the pariah state of the Pacific
  2. Fiji and The Forum
  3. A year of greater entrenchment for Fiji’s military regime
  4. Fiji’s Long Shadow

What other people are reading:

  1. Japan’s foreign economic relations
  2. US engagement with Asia – Weekly editorial
  3. The challenge of becoming a ‘multiethnic Korea’ in the 21st century


A different take on the issue of Fiji, was a parting short from Lowy-Institute, Meyer Foundation Melanesia Program, where Jenny Hayward Jones interpreted her perceptions from a skewed prism.


The excerpt from Jones last post from Melanesian Program:

THE MYER FOUNDATION MELANESIA PROGRAM

What have I changed my mind about this year? China in the Pacific

By Jenny Hayward-Jones - 23 December 2010 11:41AM

I have for some time been relatively sanguine about the rise of China in the Pacific. I believed that, like most powers which engage with Pacific Island countries, China wanted a stable and prosperous Pacific region. Chinese trade, aid and investment in the Pacific were good if they created wealth and improved infrastructure. China's truce with Taiwan over the race for diplomatic recognition in the Pacific offered an opportunity for China to mature as a donor.

It is also vital for the Pacific to have access to a greater range of advice than that provided by Australia and New Zealand, and to have advice from other developing countries. China provides an alternative development model that offers some useful lessons for decision-makers in Pacific Islands.

But I am no longer convinced that China is a force for good in the Pacific:

Chinese infrastructure aid does not usually use local suppliers or employ many local citizens, thus constraining opportunities and creating seeds for anti-Chinese sentiment which has, in a number of countries, already resulted in racially-motivated violence.
Pacific Island nations are experiencing or will experience difficulties repaying Chinese loans, resulting in higher debt-to-GDP ratios and downgrading their credit ratings.
China has shown little interest in aid coordination and its methods of aid delivery could undermine the efforts of other donors in some Pacific countries.

The Fiji Government has invoked the Chinese model of development as justification for censoring the media and ruling by decree. This interpretation of the China model, particularly if replicated by other Pacific Island countries, has the potential to wind back progress across the region in governance and transparency.

China's inability to curb illegal Chinese immigration in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere, or to encourage Chinese companies to improve their relations with local communities or address Chinese organised crime, is likely to create more local resentment.

The rapid increase in China-Pacific Islands trade means that the two major trading partners (Australia and China) of most Pacific Island countries are strategic competitors, posing some potentially difficult choices for countries which benefit from the security umbrella provided by Australia.

China's desire to project a global presence through its economic might, diplomacy and its ability to project power into the 'second island chain' raises the possibility that it will come into conflict with US, French, Australian and New Zealand military interests in the Pacific.







It also appears that Meyer Foundation has established a different tack; moving away from the Melanesia Program which Jones was Director of, to the new sub-blog of "The Interpreter" titled "Interpreting The Aid Review".

Equally interesting is the role of Foundations, in the formation of Foreign Policy; heretofore demonstrated as a waste of resources and intellectual capacity.

Poised and seemingly benevolent these financial vehicles are, the capacity for these foundations to dictate what the policy priorities a nation undertakes makes one want to re-think, and review the proceeding steps, determining how far that logic train would extend to.

Another change in tack, also comes from Kevin Rudd, doing a fabulous P.R job in rescuing baggage from Brisbane homes, featured in an ABC video article. Suffice to say, the ABC reporter aided and abetted(even assisting in baggage handling) the PR campaign, that may be perceived as staged. Another embedded reporter?


(Video Posted below)




One should not dismiss, Rudd's ability to seize the window of opportunity, given the situation; since it was Rudd was just visiting troops in the Mid-East, according to the Foreign Minister's own Youtube channel.



Video of Rudd visiting troops and others(posted below):












Save Page As PDF
Zemanta Pixie
Social Bookmarking
Add to: Digg Add to: Del.icio.us Add to: Reddit Add to: StumbleUpon Add to: Furl Add to: Yahoo Add to: Spurl Add to: Google Add to: Technorati Add to: Newsvine

Thursday, November 18, 2010

Trans-Tasman Reflexivity In South Pacific Geopolitics

Lowy Interpreter blog posting quotes from Jon Frankel.

One outstanding rebuttal to Frankel's obdurate and insulated view of South Pacific geopolitics, comes from the Kiwi Politico's latest post titled "Small Feels Large, But Only To The Small".

The excerpt of Kiwi Politico posting:


Small feels Large, but only to the Small.

datePosted on 14:37, November 14th, 2010 by Pablo

From the rhetoric and doe-eyed looks emanating from the PM and Foreign Minister during the signing of the so-called “Wellington Declaration,” one would have thought that NZ had just been awarded most favoured nation status by the US and assumed a place akin to that of France or Germany in US foreign policy. This belief seems to have gone to the head of the PM, who has taken to lecturing larger states such as Japan on NZ expectations when it comes to trading agreements.

The truth is a bit different.

The “strategic partnership” announced by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirms what has been apparent to the international security community since 2001: NZ quietly dropped its concerns about engaging in military-to-military relations with the US in exchange for the US routinely granting executive permission for these to occur.

NZ military deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter reportedly involving more than just the one year rotation of combat engineers in Basra, something that the NZ government refuses to acknowledge), as well as NZ commitment of intelligence assets to both tactical and strategic intelligence gathering at home and abroad (such as the deployment of GCSB and SIS personnel to Afghanistan) all occurred without fanfare and in spite of the formal ban of military exchanges and exercises in effect since the dissolution of the ANZUS alliance.

Not having US Navy surface ship port visits in NZ does not deter US submarines from entering NZ territorial waters with or without NZ government connivance, and any look at video of NZDF troops in action in foreign locales clearly shows that they work in close proximity to US troops and preferentially use US equipment during the conduct of their combat operations.

The Wellington Declaration just makes public this discreet relationship, which even as it deepens and becomes standardised over the long-term will not require signing of a formal alliance treaty. The latter is seen as an encumbrance for domestic political reasons on both sides (since both the US Congress and NZ Parliament would see opposition to the signing of a bilateral security treaty), so much as in the way the US conducts its foreign wars (which is to not seek Congressional ratification of a declaration of war for fear of opposition, but instead to use Executive authority as commander-in-chief to declare a state of national security emergency requiring military combat deployments abroad that presents Congress with a fait accompli), the Wellington Declaration circumvents legislative scrutiny at the same time that it reaffirms the obvious close security ties that exist between the two states.

What changed most clearly is that while Labour prefers to soft peddle the relationship due to its internal factional dynamics, National has always had issues with the “independent and autonomous” foreign policy stance that has characterised NZ diplomatic relations since the early 1990s. Although it cannot reverse the anti-nuclear policy due to domestic political factors, National has always worked to reaffirm its “traditional” security ties, to the point that it supported NZ joining the US-led “coalition of the willing” that invaded and occupied Iraq without UN authorisation. With the Wellington Declaration it has gotten its wish.

But sometimes getting what one wishes for brings with it unanticipated trouble. By formally committing to a strategic partnership with the US, overlapped on National’s commitment to engaging closer military ties with Australia, NZ has in effect become a posse member for the global sheriff and its Antipodean deputy. The closer the level of military engagement between NZ and its larger military partners (quaintly called “interoperability” in the jargon), the more dependent it becomes on them for strategic guidance, material support, operational readiness and deployed force security. This makes it more likely, in spite of National’s assurances that NZ always retains the option to refuse a request, that NZ will wind up becoming involved in conflicts not of its choice but that of its strategic partners. That in turn raises the specter of NZ developing, by way of military coat-tailing, hostile relations with countries and cultures with which it historically has had no quarrel, which will spell the end of its “independent and autonomous” diplomatic posture.

What Mr. Key and his company of advisors appear to not understand is that the US rapprochement with NZ is due to two basic strategic factors, one general and one specific, that have little to do with interest in NZ per se. The first general reason is that, after a delay in responding due to the obsession with counter-terrorism in the Middle East and Central Asia, the US has moved to counter Chinese advances in the Western Pacific basin, which it sees as the next big strategic conflict zone. Not only is it in the process of moving the bulk of its military assets into the Pacific, in a reversal of the century-old Atlantic and Euro-centric orientation that characterised its strategic outlook until recently. It has also reaffirmed its bilateral security ties to all of its Asian partners as well as India. This includes Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, NZ and even Viet Nam.

This defensive arc covers countries deeply concerned about Chinese neo-imperialist ambitions, many of whom have diplomatic or territorial disputes with the Chinese, and along with its soft power projection in the Pacific Island Forum countries (including Fiji, where the US has just announced the resumption of US AID development work), the US is moving to counter Chinese influence in SE Asia and beyond (most often gained via so-called “chequebook diplomacy” whereby China promotes infrastructure development projects with no apparent strings attached but which all have potentially dual civilian and military applications). The Wellington Declaration just adds NZ to the roster of US security partners that constitute a collective hedge against the looming Chinese presence, which is particularly noteworthy because of NZ’s increased dependency on Chinese investment and trade for its economic fortunes.

With the Wellington Declaration Chinese influence and ambitions in NZ are potentially fence-ringed. That may have been National’s undeclared intent, and if so that is the hypothetical NZ gain from the deal. But all of that remains to be seen (if nothing else because it would contravene National’s public assurances that it welcomes the Chinese investment and cultural presence on NZ shores–cue revelations about Pansy Wong and her long obviously dodgy failed businessman-husband, who just might have caught US negative interest given the Chinese penchant for placing intelligent assets in their diaspora).

The second, specific strategic purpose that the Wellington Declaration serves is US nuclear counter-proliferation efforts. Unlike its predecessor, the Obama administration has a basic, and apparently sincere interest in reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond those that currently possess them. Having a small “neutral” non-nuclear state as a partner in such efforts provides a convenient and effective cover (some might say fig leaf), particularly with regards to “rogue” states such as North Korea and Iran.

NZ has already participated in the Six Party negotiations on the North Korean nuclear programme, helping to gain a delay in Pyongyang’s efforts to achieve full weapons capability. In Iran’s case, NZ’s strong economic ties to the mullah’s regime is seen as providing a source of indirect diplomatic access and backdoor entry into the Iranian mindset with regards to nukes (via diplomatic and intelligence service information sharing). In other words, working with and through NZ on matters of nuclear proliferation, the US gains diplomatic cover for its own self-interested reasons to oppose the spread of the universally recognised deterrent.

What NZ does not get out of this strategic partnership, and which the National government continues to wax deluded about, is improved negotiating status with the US with regard to bilateral trade. The US is content to allow the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations to take their course with respect to trade with NZ and other small Pacific partners, and domestic political considerations accentuated by the recent midterm elections make it nigh impossible for NZ’s leading export sector, dairy, to make inroads into the subsidised US market. Truth be told, for the US there is no “issue-linkage” between security and trade when it comes to NZ even if its rhetoric continues to hold out the promise of such being the case sometime in the future. Yet the current (and to be fair, the past) NZ government continues to insist that, “difficulties” notwithstanding, bilateral trade with the US in forthcoming if not imminent because of NZ efforts across a range of issues of mutual interest without qualification or constraint.

This is where Mr. Key and Mr. McCully fail the foreign policy leadership test. Given the US strategic interests at play, and its absolute need to secure partnership agreements that catered to these interests given the evolving world balance of power, NZ was in a position to bargain hard and leverage its credentials (mostly Labour-made) as an honest broker and reliable international interlocutor into some form of tangible, immediate benefit in exchange for accepting the role of US strategic partner. That did not happen. Instead, what NZ got was platitudes, promises and bilateral yearly meetings between foreign policy counterparts, something that is par for the course for any number of nations, in what essentially amounted to a stop-over on Secretary Clinton’s trip to more important meetings with the US proxy that is Australia. As a result of that brief rendezvous, NZ is now saddled with the burden of being internationally perceived to be (if not in fact) more closely tied to the US without the full benefits of being so. It is a junior partner of the US in security only, and that is bound to be noticed by the international community.

In effect, NZ is just a small cog in a larger US strategic plan that is influenced by factors that have nothing to do with NZ interests and all to do with how the US sees and proposes to shape the strategic environment currently evolving in the Western Pacific and with regard to nuclear proliferation. National believes that it has made NZ a “player” by signing a strategic partnership agreement with the US, but the truth is that it has committed the country to a relationship that has always been one sided and which just got more so. To put it bluntly: the Tories may feel big as a result of the “Wellington Declaration” but they still are small and myopic when it comes to perceiving, much less comprehending the bigger picture, to say nothing of the realities at stake down the road.

PS: The farce only gets better. NZ announced that it is in FTA negotiations with authoritarian, crime mob-dominated klepto-oligarchic Russia even though it admits that Foreign Affairs and Trade have very limited Russian language comprehension skills and the deal will involve Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Russia negotiating for them, presumably), two states that NZ has admitted to having”limited” knowledge about (to include comprehension of Tajik or Uzbek dialects). In other words, National has staked its claim to being at the forefront of free trade agreements without understanding the business and political culture, much less language or human rights conditions, of potential partners just after it committed to a long-term security partnership with a country that has a troublesome relationship with all three. This is amateurism taken to art-level heights.

Pablo (pablo@kiwipolitico.com)

Raised in Latin America by expat American parents and attracted to anti-authoritarian politics beginning in his early teens, he combined a career in academia with episodic forays into the US security and defence apparatus before emigrating to New Zealand in 1997. Now engaged in political risk consulting with an emphasis on Australaisan-global relations and a focus on ethical exchange, in New Zealand he developed an interest in small state analysis and is writing a book on the security politics of peripheral democracies (Chile, New Zealand and Portugal). His policy interests are in comparative labour politics, labour market dynamics, comparative regime change, comparative democracy, strategic thought, intelligence analysis, threat (net) assessment and unconventional warfare.



Save Page As PDF
Zemanta Pixie
Social Bookmarking
Add to: Digg Add to: Del.icio.us Add to: Reddit Add to: StumbleUpon Add to: Furl Add to: Yahoo Add to: Spurl Add to: Google Add to: Technorati Add to: Newsvine